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Abstract. The economic crisis that started in 2008 has negatively affected European nations to different
degrees.The sudden rise in demonstrations particularly in those countries most hard hit by the crisis suggests
that grievance theories, dismissed in favour of resource-based models since the 1970s, might have a role to
play in explaining protest behaviour.While most previous studies have tested these theories at the individual
or contextual levels, it is likely that mechanisms at both levels are interrelated. To fill this lacuna, this article
examines the ways in which individual-level grievances interact withmacro-level factors to impact on protest
behaviour. In particular, it examines whether the impact of individual subjective feelings of deprivation is
conditional on contextual macroeconomic and policy factors. It is found that while individual-level relative
deprivation has a direct effect on the propensity to have protested in the last year, this effect is greater under
certain macroeconomic and political conditions. Both significant results for the cross-level interactions are
interpreted in terms of their role for opening up political opportunities for protest among those who feel they
have beenmost deprived in the current crisis.These findings suggest that the interaction of the contextual and
individual levels should continue to be explored in future studies in order to further clarify the mechanisms
underlying protest behaviour.
Keywords: protest; participation; relative deprivation; macroeconomic context; political opportunity
structure
Introduction
The economic crisis that started in 2008 has led to growing unemployment and shrinking
economic growth across Europe and the rest of the world (De Grauwe & Ji 2013). Almost
ten years on, there is great variation in the economic conditions of different European
nations. Particularly in those countries worst hit by economic recession, large protests took
place as European governments were blamed for the deteriorating conditions (Rüdig &
Karyotis 2013;Giugni &Grasso 2015a;Grasso &Giugni 2013, 2016).All these observations
raise important questions with respect to the relationship between protest behaviour and
micro- and macro-level deprivation. They also motivate an interrogation of the nature of
the link with a perceived imbalance between expected standards of living and the realities
of current economic conditions as a result of the economic crisis.
The literature on social movements has been split between those emphasising the
importance of resources for political involvement and those instead seeing grievances as
an important spur for action. Since the 1970s, objective material conditions and deprivation
have largely been dismissed as explanations for political action (Useem 1998; Buechler
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2004). Earlier scholars such as Smelser (1962), Gurr (1970) and to some extent Piven
and Cloward (1977) had seen negative material conditions, expressed in grievances, as the
precondition spurring individuals to contentious political action.However, the main strands
of research on mobilisation emerging since then, including ‘resource mobilisation theory’
(RMT) (e.g., McCarthy & Zald 1973), political process (e.g., Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982;
Kriesi et al. 1995) and new social movement theory (Touraine 1981; Melucci 1989) have
viewed material hardship as largely unimportant or only relevant to the extent that social
movements could frame it in ways to mobilise action.
The sudden rise of protest movements during the recent economic crisis has brought
to the fore once more the question of whether grievance theories may play a role in
explaining collective action. Scholars have started to re-examine the impact of grievances
on protest behaviour (e.g., Rüdig & Karyotis 2013; Bernburg, 2015). However, most studies
only examine the effect of these factors onmobilisation from either an individual or amacro-
level perspective, but do not consider the interaction of individual and contextual level
factors (Kern et al. (2015) is a recent exception, but here change in economic conditions
is examined and the focus is not protest specifically). To address this gap in the literature,
we examine the interplay of micro-level grievances and macro-level factors for protest
behaviour. In particular, we argue that the extent of the effect of individual deprivation
on protest is conditional upon the presence of contextual macroeconomic and policy factors
which broaden out perceived political opportunities.
The high levels of variation in the current economic contexts of European nations
and the differences in policy responses across national governments provide an excellent
test case for investigating these macro-micro interactions. While subjective perceptions
of relative deprivation have been shown to be important for mobilisation to contentious
political action (Klandermans et al. 2008), we argue that individuals also take cues from
the general economic environment and that state policies will also have an impact on
mobilisation (see Giugni and Grasso (2015b), for example, in relation to the environmental
movement).We theorise that the impact of feelings of relative deprivation on engagement in
protest activities is moderated bymacroeconomic and political contextual factors (Giugni &
Grasso 2016).To investigate this proposition we analyse data from an original cross-national
survey conducted in 2015 in the context of the ‘Living with Hard Times’ (LIVEWHAT)
project [grant agreement number 613237] coordinated by the University of Geneva (Marco
Giugni) and funded by the European Commission under the auspices of the 7th Framework
Programme.We specify multilevel models with cross-level interactions and show that micro-
level deprivation interacts with contextual factors to spur protest behaviour. In what follows,
we first review previous research, then detail the data andmethods used in our study,present
our results and finally discuss their wider implications for the discipline and for theorising
about protest in times of crisis.
Previous research
As citizens struggle to cope with the negative effects of the economic crisis, attention has
been drawn to related issues of fairness and the distribution of resources in society. Recent
years have seen a growth in studies on inequality (Nolan & Whelan 2011; Musterd &
Ostendorf 2013; Dorling 2014; Piketty 2014; Atkinson 2015). While less has been written
C© 2016TheAuthors.European Journal of Political Research published by JohnWiley&SonsLtd on behalf of EuropeanConsortium for PoliticalResearch
PROTEST PARTICIPATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 665
on the political ramifications of these developments, some social movement scholars have
recently sought to ‘bring capitalism back into protest analysis’ (Della Porta 2015). With
the economic crisis still unfolding and growing inequality across the globe, it is time to re-
examine the debate in political science, sociology and social movement studies over whether
deprivation leads to an increase or a decrease in protest participation.
Grievance theories see material deprivation as instrumental to social movement
mobilisation (Useem 1998; Buechler 2004). Various feelings such as psychological strain,
alienation and other negative emotions are understood to emerge from it, leading people
to challenge the political order (Opp 1988). Kornhauser’s (1959) mass society theory
emphasised concerns over anomie and egoism present in Emile Durkheim’s classic work
and suggested that the breakdown of mid-level groups and social anchors would lead
individuals to gravitate to collective behaviour as one of the only few available sources
of social belonging in modernity. Smelser (1962) combined strain and breakdown theories
focusing on dissolution of social cohesion during periods of change into a structural-
functionalist theory of collective behaviour.An important variant in the grievance tradition
is relative deprivation theory (Gurr 1970). Here the strain is understood at the individual
level and pertains to comparisons either with some reference group or oneself against
past or future selves (Buechler 2004). Relative deprivation theory in particular emphasises
the gap between expectations and experienced reality (Geschwender 1968; Davies
1962).
While stressing the primacy of perceptions of illegitimate deprivation, Thompson (1971)
and Scott (1976) also saw a role for structural breakdown in explanations of protest. Piven
and Cloward (1977) combined political factors and the stress of structural changes wrought
by the Great Depression in their explanation of social unrest.While some elements of strain
and breakdown theories persisted in these works and those of Useem (1980), Goldstone
(1986, 1991a, 1991b) and Snow et al. (1998), among others, a large number of scholars
challenged grievance-related explanations as they did not seem particularly useful to make
sense of the new social movements emerging since the 1960s–1970s. For example, Tilly et al.
(1975) emphasised group solidarity as the key factor explaining collective action. More
generally, resource mobilisation theory emphasised the rationality of social movements as
following the patterns of more institutional types of action (McCarthy & Zald 1973, 1977;
Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978). Since grievances were understood as constant over time they
were discounted as explanatory factors for mobilisation and the focus moved on to that
which varied – that is, resources (McCarthy & Zald 1977). Individual-level studies also
supported resource-based accounts, and education, occupation and income were seen as
major drivers of participation (Verba et al. 1995).
One of the clearest challenges to the idea that grievances led to protest came from
political process theory (Tilly 1978;McAdam 1982). Political opportunity structures, central
to this approach, were understood in terms of the institutional features of the political
system and the set-up of the configurations of power relative to challengers such as social
movements. Political process theory emphasised the importance of resources and political
opportunities, but also the subjective dimension of protest and framing (Eisinger 1973;
Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1994; McAdam 1996; Kriesi 2004; Meyer 2004). The key insight was
perhaps the suggestion that the subjective understanding of the status quo as something
that could be challenged provided the rational basis for protest (McAdam 1982). For
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example, McVeigh (2009) noted how declining power altered individuals’ perceptions of
their circumstances and provided opportunities for constructing new mobilising frames.
While the emphasis tends to be placed on the social construction of grievances as critical
for protest (Klandermans et al. 2008), some prominent studies have noted how ‘objective’
grievances can also be relevant (Snow et al. 1998; McVeigh 2009). Snow et al.’s ‘disruption
of the quotidian’ framework emphasises the role of interference with normal routines in the
tradition of Piven and Cloward (1977). Disruptions could be nuclear disasters or threats to
the neighbourhood. Deprivation that leads to changes in routines can become a quotidian
disruption (Snow & Soule 2009). Protest could result from deprivation without an equal
decline in expectations (Thomassen 1989).
More recently, the economic crisis has spurred further studies of the impact of economic
hardship on political participation. However, none of these studies looks specifically at
the relationship between protest and relative deprivation, and most of them focus on just
the individual or macro-level, and thus cannot test for cross-level interactions between
the two. Caren et al. (forthcoming) use newspaper reports of contentious acts across 157
countries during 1960–2001 and find a significant negative relation between contentious acts
and economic growth. Laurence and Lim (2012) show that the economic crisis depressed
volunteering in the United States and the United Kingdom (see also Clarke & Heath
2014; Lim & Laurence 2015). Using 2004 International Social Survey Programme data,
Dodson (2015) finds evidence that the mobilising effects of economic uncertainty are
strongest among the most vulnerable. Kern et al. (2015) use European Social Survey data
for 2002–2010 to show a direct effect of unemployment change between 2009 and 2010
on a scale measure of non-institutionalised participation. However, they find no significant
cross-level interaction for ‘double-deprivation theory’ (Foster & Matheson 1995: 1168): the
expectation that in countries particularly hit by the crisis ‘the personal becomes political’ so
that individuals who suffer become particularly motivated to action.
In this article we build on the idea from political process theory that grievances matter to
the extent that they are socially constructed and subjectively perceived in order to develop
our argument that deprivation felt by individuals in times of crisis will be more likely to
lead to protest behaviour under certain contextual conditions, or political opportunities.
Following Bermeo and Bartels (2014),we suggest that the policies implemented by national
governments may also interact with individual-level relative deprivation to spur political
action. This argument develops from political opportunity theory since policies are an
important component of political opportunities (Meyer 2004).
Our argument, we hope, also contributes to the literature by examining how economic
and political factors configuring the political opportunity structures in turn interact with
deprivation to enhance the protest potential of grievances. Case studies of marginalised
groups such as the homeless (Snow et al. 2005), militias (Van Dyke & Soule 2002), the
Ku Klux Klan (McVeigh 2009) or the unemployed (Giugni 2008) provide mixed support
for the influence of economic threat on mobilisation. Research to date has examined how
institutional structures allow marginalised groups such as the unemployed opportunities
to mobilise (Chabanet & Faniel 2012; Giugni 2008). Studies have shown that mobilisation
of the unemployed is higher where cultural contexts support it and where elites are more
open to these types of demands. Generally, contexts characterised by higher levels of social
spending are contexts more encouraging of the protest of those who are relatively more
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deprived. Higher levels of social spending denote more social democratic political cultures
where inequality and poverty are constructed as social and political problems. In turn,
this leads individuals to understand their deprivation as susceptible to political solutions
through political participation. On the other hand, liberal or neoliberal contexts tend to
be characterised by more individualised understandings of poverty, thus depressing protest
action. Taken together, these considerations contribute to the theoretical argument that
we develop and test in this article in keeping with the political opportunity approach that
suggests that the effect of individual relative deprivation will be emphasised under certain
contextual dynamics.
To summarise, we expect that relative deprivation will spur engagement in protest
activism to a greater extent where it occurs in concomitance with macro-level external
conditions in terms of more open political opportunity structures. The former could be
seen to be reflected in high unemployment rates or slow economic growth, while the latter
can be seen in particular in higher levels of social spending or higher rates of taxation. We
understand these conditions to be conducive to the politicisation of individual deprivation,
thus spurring political action to a greater degree than simply the direct effect.By developing
and testing a theory on the interrelation between relative deprivation, macroeconomic
context and political opportunity structures our research also heeds the calls to develop
scholarship on micro-macro linkages for explaining protest (Opp 2009).
Data and methods
We use data from an original cross-national survey (N = 18,370) conducted in 2015
in the context of the ‘Living with Hard Times’ (LIVEWHAT) project funded by the
European Commission under the auspices of their 7th Framework Programme. The survey
was conducted in each of the nine European countries included in the project (France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) by a
specialised polling agency (YouGov) using online panels with the methodologies available
in each country and quota balanced in order to match national population statistics in terms
of region, sex, age and education level. We also include macro-level data from 2014 from
the World Bank on unemployment and gross domestic product (GDP) growth as well as
from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development on government social
spending and tax wedges.Descriptive statistics for all the variables are presented in Table 1.
Once all missing values are removed, the final sample is 17,667 (Ns for each country are
reported in Table 2).
Our dependent variable is a dichotomous one, measuring whether someone had
participated in protests in the last 12 months. Since studies have shown that protest
participation has features distinct from other types of political action that could reasonably
be classed in the ‘unconventional’ realm (Grasso 2011, 2014, 2016), we do not create
scales of activities but rather focus on this ‘modal’ expression (Tarrow 1996) of social
movement activism, also as exemplified by the anti-austerity demonstrations taking place
as a result of the crisis. As an alternative, scales for non-institutional participation (e.g.,
Kern et al. 2015) could be problematic, particularly at the cross-national level, since they
include very different types of political action that are likely to have different relationships
with deprivation. Additionally, some actions, such as petitioning, are extremely popular
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Table 1. Variable descriptive statistics
Standard
Variable Observations Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
Protest participation 17,667 0.11 0.31 0 1
Relative deprivation 17,667 0.45 0.50 0 1
Age 17,667 44.82 14.81 18 88
Gender (male) 17,667 0.47 0.50 0 1
Education level (less than upper secondary) 17,667 0.24 0.43 0 1
Occupation (manual) 17,667 0.24 0.43 0 1
Unemployed 17,667 0.12 0.32 0 1
Political interest 17,667 0.64 0.48 0 1
Internal political efficacy 17,667 0.49 0.40 0 1
External political efficacy 17,667 0.48 0.36 0 1
Left-right values 17,667 5.24 1.84 0 10
Libertarian-authoritarian values 17,667 4.47 1.88 0 10
Organisational memberships 17,667 1.25 2.38 0 12
Unemployment rate 2014 17,667 11.93 7.75 4.5 26.5
GDP growth 2014 17,667 1.53 1.13 –0.4 3.4
Social spending 2014 17,667 25.20 3.88 19.4 31.9
Tax wedge 2014 17,667 39.83 8.47 22.3 49.3
Relative deprivation x Unemployment 17,667 6.61 9.24 0 26.5
Relative deprivation x GDP growth 17,667 0.58 0.99 –0.4 3.4
Relative deprivation x Social spending 17,667 11.55 12.92 0 31.9
Relative deprivation x Tax wedge 17,667 18.39 20.82 0 49.3
whereas other forms, such as demonstrating, are practiced by much smaller fractions of the
population. Moreover, since we want to understand the impact of the economic context in
2014 on participation in 2015,we limited the indicator to participation in the last year.Table 2
shows the proportion of individuals that said they had demonstrated in the last 12 months in
each country.As we can see, there is a reasonable degree of variation, part of which appears
to be related to the severity and extent of the crisis. Countries where the crisis had deeper
effects saw greater levels of protest (e.g., Greece).
The key independent variable for subjective feelings of relative deprivation is
retrospective to the last five years so that the deterioration of conditions relative to
expectations should have at least begun to occur prior to protest participation in the last
12 months and, as such, the time-ordering of independent and dependent variables respects
the requirements of causality. Respondents were asked whether they felt that the economic
situation of their household was much better or much worse than it was five years ago.
We dichotomise this measure following previous research (Rüdig & Karyotis 2013) in a
dummy for whether individuals felt the economic situation of their household had become
worse. Table 2 also shows the proportion of individuals who said the economic situation had
become worse in each country. Here too, there is a good amount of variation.
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Our key macroeconomic variables aim to examine both negative and positive indicators
of economic context. On the one hand, high unemployment levels are perhaps the most
pernicious consequence of the current economic crisis in Europe. Countries like Greece
and Spain, where unemployment is highest, are those that in general have suffered the most
from the current economic crisis. On the other hand, we also examine GDP growth as this
is perhaps the clearest measure that a country is doing well and is coming out of recession.
Both variables are taken for 2014 in order to examine conditions prior to participation but
not too far back in time.
On the policy side,we include twomeasures: the government expenses for social policies
(as a percentage of the GDP) and the tax wedge (as a percentage of labour cost). These
two variables reflect also a definition of austerity policies as reducing government spending,
especially in the social realm,and increasing taxation,especially on labour.Most importantly
for our present purpose, they are meant to capture the output side of political opportunity
structures. Again, both variables are taken for 2014.
We also include in our models the usual sociodemographic controls (for more
information, see Grasso et al. 2016; Grasso 2013; Dunn et al. 2014; Saunders et al. 2012):
age, gender (male), education level (less than upper secondary), occupation (manual) and
employment status (whether the respondent is unemployed). Furthermore, we include a
number of controls for political attitudes and resources: political interest, internal and
external political efficacy (the external political efficacy scale is reversed), left-right values,
libertarian-authoritarian values, and number of organisational memberships (descriptive
statistics and distributions by country for all dependent and independent variables are
provided in Tables 1 and 2).
Our dependent variable is measured at the individual level but we have independent
variables at both the individual and the country levels. Moreover, we are interested in
the interactions between these two levels since our argument refers to differences in
how individual subjective feelings of deprivation relate to individuals’ protest behaviour
according to country-level economic and political contexts. For this reason, we specify
multilevel models with random intercept coefficients to take into account the two-level
nature of the data (country and individual). This model is useful to correct for the within-
country dependence of observations (intra-class correlation), and adjusts both within and
between parameter estimates in relation to the clustered nature of the data (Snijders &
Bosker 1999). Since our dependent variable is dichotomous, we estimate logistic multilevel
models with a Gaussian link function.
Findings
We specify ten models reported in Table 3: model 1 is the empty model; model 2 includes
the key individual-level independent variable measuring relative deprivation and only
the individual-level control variables; model 3 includes the first macro-level indicator –
unemployment rate in 2014; model 4 includes GDP growth in 2014; model 5 includes social
spending in 2014; andmodel 6 includes tax wedge in 2014.Models 7–10 include, in turn, each
of the four macro-level variables from models 3–6 and the relevant cross-level interaction
with individual relative deprivation.
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Model fit improves with the inclusion of the individual-level variables as signalled by
the reduction in log likelihood. There is also an improvement with the inclusion of the
macro-level factors and their cross-level interactions with relative deprivation, particularly
unemployment in models 3 and 7. Across models 1–6 (models 7–10 include cross-level
interactions) relative deprivation has a positive effect on protest participation. Model 2
including all the individual-level controls shows that there is no significant effect of
low education level or having a manual occupation on participation. However, being
unemployed has a negative and significant effect across models. In other words, at the
individual level there is very little evidence for grievance theory: being unemployed reduces
chances of demonstrating (this also goes against the predictions of biographical availability
in some specifications). Also in line with the resources/SES and civic voluntarism model
(Verba et al. 1995), having a greater political interest, having stronger internal and external
efficacy (the direction of the items in the scale is negative so the effect of external efficacy is
also positive), being more left-wing (relative to right-wing) and also being more libertarian
(relative to more authoritarian) all have a significant and positive effect on protest; as
expected, organisational membership also has a strong positive effect.
What happens when we consider the macro-level economic factors? When the first
contextual variable – unemployment – is included in model 3, we can see that there is a
positive and significant effect of this macroeconomic context variable on demonstrating.
Individuals in countries with higher unemployment are more likely to have engaged in
protests in the last 12 months. At first glance, this provides some evidence for grievance
theory: at the macro-level, countries with worse economic conditions are more likely to
experience protest. However, the inclusion of this macro-level variable in model 3 does
not remove the individual-level effect of relative deprivation found previously. Subjective
feelings of relative deprivation still have an impact regardless of whether individuals are
living in countries with high or low unemployment levels. This suggests that individuals
examine their own household situation with respect to their expectations of where they
should have been and this mechanism operates independently of wider comparisons.
When GDP growth is included in model 4, there is a negative and significant direct
effect of this economic context variable on protest. Individuals in countries with lower
GDP growth are more likely to have engaged in protests in the last 12 months. Again,
this might be seen as providing evidence for grievance theory: at the macro-level, countries
with lower levels of economic growth are more likely to experience protest. However, the
inclusion of this macro-level variable inmodel 4 does not remove the individual-level effects
found previously. Subjective feelings of relative deprivation still have an impact regardless
of whether individuals are living in countries with high or low GDP growth.Once more, this
supports the idea that individuals primarily examine their own household situation with
respect to their expectations of where they should have been and that wider comparisons
do not explain away the effect of subjective feelings of relative deprivation.
Turning to macro-level political factors, we observe a similar pattern as for the
economic context. When social spending is included in model 5, it has a positive effect
on demonstration activities. We interpret this as signalling more open political opportunity
structures. Again, the inclusion of this macro-level political factor does not erode the effect
of relative deprivation, meaning that the latter still has an impact regardless of whether
individuals are living in countries with diverse levels of spending.
C© 2016TheAuthors.European Journal of Political Research published by JohnWiley&SonsLtd on behalf of EuropeanConsortium for PoliticalResearch
PROTEST PARTICIPATION AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 673
When including tax wedge in model 6 there is a small but significant (p 0.10) effect: the
greater the tax wedge, the greater the protest.This is in line with Bermeo and Bartels’ (2014)
hypothesis that people react to austerity policies rather than directly to the negative effects
of the economic crisis. At the same time, however, the inclusion of this macro-level factor
once again does not change the effect of relative deprivation. In other words, the latter plays
a role net of this measure.
The main goal of this research, developing on previous work in the literature, was
to combine the individual- and macro-level perspectives on protest mobilisation in
times of crisis. To extend this framework, models 7–10 include cross-level interactions
between each of our macro-level variables and relative deprivation at the individual
level in turn. Our results, as presented in model 7, show that in countries with higher
unemployment rates, the effect of feelings of relative deprivation on participation is
increased. This suggests that individual-level subjective perceptions of relative deprivation
are amplified by the wider national economic context. Individuals feeling that their
conditions have deteriorated in the last five years in countries such as Greece or Spain
are likely to have experienced worse deterioration than individuals in countries such
as Germany and Switzerland that have had less negative experiences of the recent
economic crisis. These results thus show that while deprivation at the individual level
has a positive effect on protest participation regardless of the economic context, at
higher levels of unemployment the effect of deprivation is magnified relative to contexts
with lower unemployment. In turn, this suggests that this type of contextual fact may
serve to politicise individual deprivation, as we discuss in more detail in the final
section.
We find this conditional effect also for the political context in terms of the political
opportunity structure offered by social democracies with more extensive welfare states.
These results are shown in model 9. In contrast, neither GDP growth (model 8) nor tax
wedge (model 10) condition the effect of individual relative deprivation in this respect while
they do have a direct effect on protest participation.
Model 7, with one cross-level interaction for relative deprivation and unemployment,
showed that the coefficient for relative deprivation is –0.10 and not significant, which means
that there is no difference between those who are relatively more or less deprived when
the unemployment rate is 0. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for the
interaction term between relative deprivation and unemployment (0.02) suggests that the
gap between those who are relatively more or less deprived increases as unemployment
goes up. For every percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, the gap in the
log-odds of protesting increases by 0.02. At what point do the relatively deprived start
protesting at higher levels than those who do not feel deprived? These estimates suggest
that the two groups start departing when unemployment reaches a level of 5 per cent
(i.e., –0.10/0.02 = –5) – that is, quite low. For social spending, in model 9, the positive and
statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term between relative deprivation and
social spending (0.03) suggests that the gap in protesting between those who are relatively
more or less deprived also increases as social spending rises. For every percentage point
increase in social spending, the gap in the log-odds of protesting between the two groups
increases by 0.03; the relatively deprived start protesting at higher levels than those who
are less deprived when social spending is over 21.33 per cent of GDP (–0.64/0.03 = –21.33).
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Figure 1. Plot of the cross-level interaction between relative deprivation and unemployment (adjusted
predictions model 7).
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Figure 2. Plot of the cross-level interaction between relative deprivation and social spending (adjusted
predictions model 9).
To visualise these patterns more clearly, Figures 1 and 2 plot the cross-level interaction
effects between relative deprivation and both unemployment and social spending, in turn.
These graphs clearly show that the effect of personal deprivation is amplified in contexts
of high unemployment (i.e., above 5 per cent) and in contexts where there are relatively
higher levels of social spending as a proportion of GDP (i.e., greater than 21.33 per cent).
We interpret both these findings in light of political opportunity structure theory: a situation
of high unemployment opens up the political space for individual levels of deprivation to
become understood at a more collective level and therefore to become the basis for political
mobilisation. Similarly, for social spending, we argue that contexts where social spending
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is higher are already contexts where the opportunity structure, with respect to protest, is
more open. In countries where social spending is lower, neoliberal approaches to welfare
and the individualisation of poverty and deprivation tend to be normalised. On the other
hand, in contexts where social spending is higher there tends to be a greater receptivity to
understanding poverty and inequality as social and political problems that can be redressed
through collective action.
Discussion and conclusion
Our study shows the value of examining the cross-context conditionality of grievances and
opportunities for individual-level protest participation. We show that individuals who feel
that their conditions have deteriorated are more likely to take to the streets. We thus
find evidence supporting Snow et al.’s (1998) thesis that the mismatch between current
standards of living and expectations has some role to play for mobilising individuals, net
of their objective economic position in society. This is an important result since it shows
that when understood in subjective and relative terms grievances do have an impact on
mobilisation. Linking these subjective feelings to the wider economic and political context,
we find that not only do individual-level feelings of relative deprivation have a direct effect
on the propensity to have protested in the last year, but that this effect is greater in contexts
characterised by either higher unemployment rates or higher levels of social spending. We
interpret both findings in terms of their role for opening up political opportunities for protest
among thosewho felt a deterioration of living standards in the current crisis.While grievance
theories and political opportunity approaches appear to be at odds with each other, the
significant results for the cross-level interactions between relative deprivation and macro-
level factors show that context conditions the extent of the effect of individual deprivation
on political action. We argue that this evidence for contextual influences on the effect of
individual-level deprivation for protest can be interpreted in terms of political opportunity
theory.
Both grievances and political opportunities, if specified correctly, are shown to contribute
to our understanding of political action. Indeed, the results of this study illustrate how it is
their dynamic interaction which explains differential protest behaviour. More specifically,
our findings show that in contexts of higher unemployment, deprived individuals protest at
higher rates than less deprived individuals. We understand higher levels of unemployment
as providing a context where individuals are more likely to understand their own relative
deprivation in a politicised way. For example, higher unemployment is more likely to
become discussed as a wider social ill affecting society and therefore leading individuals,
and particularly those who feel deprived, to becomemore likely to realise that deteriorating
living standards are not just their own, individualised private problem, but rather a
generalised, national one shared by many others in different forms (e.g., as loss of income,
loss of employment, having to make cut backs in consumption, etc.). In this way, a context
of higher unemployment can play a role in politicising private lived experience, resulting in
outward political action.We argue that individuals take cues from their wider environment
and that these lead them to become more likely to act on their subjective feelings of
deprivation by taking to the streets to protest against the government. On this reading,
a visibly deteriorated economic context is understood as providing fertile ground for the
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subjective understanding of one’s deprivation as something that can be challenged and
redressed collectively and politically.
Our results also show that the difference between citizens who feel that their conditions
deteriorated and those who do not, in terms of taking to the streets, are greater in contexts
marked by higher levels of social spending. We interpret this finding by a similar logic.
In times of crisis in particular, contexts with higher levels of social spending are those
where political opportunities for protest would be perceived as more open, thus leading
the more deprived to be more likely to take the streets. Our results show how individuals
in more social democratic arrangements appear to be more likely to react politically when
they feel that the crisis has impacted them negatively. These findings support the results
of scholarship suggesting that welfare state provisions and citizenship rights represent
critical resources for groups organising for collective action. While specific case studies
have shown that the mechanism relates to the movement in question – for example, the
mobilisation of the unemployed is linked to the extent of unemployment benefits (Giugni
2008), whereas the mobilisation of immigrants is linked to the type and level of citizenship
rights (Giugni & Passy 2004; Koopmans et al. 2005) – here we generalise this finding to
show that the welfare state, as captured by higher levels of social spending, encourages
mobilisation.
In more neoliberal contexts characterised by lower levels of social spending, on the
other hand, those who feel deprived are more likely to understand their situation in
individualised terms and therefore to be less likely to be spurred to collective, political
action. While both the deprived and less deprived are less likely to take to the streets
in countries with less generous levels of social spending, citizens who feel more deprived
in more generous welfare states are more likely to take to the streets than citizens who
feel less deprived. We suggest that this is because more generous welfare states are more
receptive to their demands since issues relating to material deprivation are more widely
understood as political problems needing collective solutions, not personal concerns that
should be privately dealt with. While other studies provide some evidence that welfare
states could be demobilising (e.g.,Dodson 2015), our study with data from 2015 suggests the
opposite. Further studies should explore this question in even greater detail and develop
analyses to further disentangle which individual- and aggregate-level factors interact with
welfare state provisions to explain the individual-level decision to become engaged in
protest.
The findings of our study emphasise the importance of examining the macro-level
economic and political contexts alongside individual-level deprivation, resources, attitudes
and networks for understanding the wider drivers of protest action. This is in line with
previous research showing that themobilisation of resource-poor groups ismore likely when
economic conditions have deteriorated (Baglioni et al. 2008; Piven & Cloward 1977). More
generally, our results suggest that individuals respond rationally to the experience of crisis,
both at the individual and aggregate levels, by expressing their voice politically though
protest. Feelings of deprivation are an important spur to the voicing of what could easily
be seen as increasing grievances in times of crisis and we show that these individual-level
influences are amplified under given contextual circumstances. Our study has highlighted,
in particular, that at least in the context of economic crisis, protest behaviour is higher
among those individuals that have felt a deterioration in their circumstances. This is net
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of all other characteristics that could be reasonably expected to foster protest behaviour at
the individual level.
At the aggregate level, we have also shown that protest is also higher in contexts
with lower GDP growth and a higher tax wedge, but these types of contexts did not
amplify the impact of individual relative deprivation on protest behaviour. On the other
hand, contexts characterised by greater unemployment and higher social spending levels
also experienced higher levels of protest while at the same time also increasing the
impact of individual-level relative deprivation. Protest in times of crisis is thus shown
to be more prevalent among individuals who feel deprived in contexts with higher and
therefore likely more politicised unemployment levels and more open political opportunity
structures afforded by the welfare state. By extension, this means that there are more
political responses to the crisis where the political opportunity conditions exist for the
political expression of grievances among more deprived groups. On the one hand, higher
levels of unemployment appear to lead individual problems of deprivation to become
more clearly collectivised in the popular and political imagination; on the other hand,
higher levels of social spending, suggesting a greater concern for the economic welfare
of citizens and particularly the more marginalised and more deprived groups, appear to
provide the legitimatisation and political space for the demands of protestors in times of
crisis.
Our study has shown that the extent to which individuals will mobilise in demonstrations
during times of crisis depends on their feeling a deterioration in their living standards
and also on the ways in which the wider environment contributes to the framing of
opportunities (Gamson & Meyer 1996). This further suggests that protest mobilisation
is borne out of the complex interaction of factors at different levels, in turn impacting
on each other. Research tends to be split between those examining individual-
level influences on protest behaviour and those examining macro-level relations. Our
findings suggest that, besides looking for direct effects of the micro- and macro-
level on protest, greater attention needs to be paid to their dynamic interaction for
understanding the decision to become politically active, particularly in times of economic
crisis.
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